During the COVID-19 pandemic, plansâ failures had little to do with the genomic sequence of the virus and more about what these plans were not: familiar, equitable and inclusive, interconnected and scalable, clear and actionable, and resilient.
The Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency defines the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector as one of â16 critical infrastructure sectors.â Read about this sectorâs numerous challenges in maintaining the high level of service necessary to the communities they serve.
The Water and Wastewater Systems Sector is one of 16 sectors identified as critical infrastructure under the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency. Domestic Preparedness invited a subject matter expert to answer questions about this sector, including how the sector and its interdependencies can affect any community.
This 2015 article touches on what can be learned from and implemented into faith-based organizations to provide greater community resilience and ensure the safety of attendees on a regular basis.
In 2011 and 2012, Domestic Preparedness conducted a nationwide survey followed by an executive briefing to discuss preparedness gaps and goals associated with a nuclear threat. Some gaps still exist.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, plansâ failures had little to do with the genomic sequence of the virus and more about what these plans were not: familiar, equitable and inclusive, interconnected and scalable, clear and actionable, and resilient.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) accounted for firearms but did not always maintain accurate records for firearm locations or quantities of ammunition, as required. During the physical inventory of firearms in storage at 12 sites, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) identified 126 firearms not located at the address indicated in CBPâs system of record. CBP also did not ensure ammunition control, accountability, and loss reporting complied with policy requirements for sensitive assets. These issues occurred because CBP did not emphasize controls over ammunition. As a result, CBP may not know whether ammunition has been lost, stolen, properly accounted for, or provided to officers for unofficial training and practice.
During the first three quarters of 2023, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) intercepted 5,072 firearms at airport security checkpoints, and at the current rate, the agency will surpass last yearâs record 6,542 firearms prevented from getting onboard aircraft.
This September edition of the Domestic Preparedness Journal addresses these and other key preparedness efforts that should be considered when planning for future incidents. Reflecting on the events of 9/11, consider the personal costs that emergency responders pay for serving their communities and develop mitigation strategies to reduce those costs. Also, evaluate the organizational changes that have occurred since 9/11 and the gaps that still need to be addressed.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, plansâ failures had little to do with the genomic sequence of the virus and more about what these plans were not: familiar, equitable and inclusive, interconnected and scalable, clear and actionable, and resilient. 
The Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency defines the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector as one of â16 critical infrastructure sectors.â Read about this sectorâs numerous challenges in maintaining the high level of service necessary to the communities they serve. 
The Water and Wastewater Systems Sector is one of 16 sectors identified as critical infrastructure under the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency. Domestic Preparedness invited a subject matter expert to answer questions about this sector, including how the sector and its interdependencies can affect any community. 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) accounted for firearms but did not always maintain accurate records for firearm locations or quantities of ammunition, as required. During the physical inventory of firearms in storage at 12 sites, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) identified 126 firearms not located at the address indicated in CBPâs system of record. CBP also did not ensure ammunition control, accountability, and loss reporting complied with policy requirements for sensitive assets. These issues occurred because CBP did not emphasize controls over ammunition. As a result, CBP may not know whether ammunition has been lost, stolen, properly accounted for, or provided to officers for unofficial training and practice. 
This September edition of the Domestic Preparedness Journal addresses these and other key preparedness efforts that should be considered when planning for future incidents. Reflecting on the events of 9/11, consider the personal costs that emergency responders pay for serving their communities and develop mitigation strategies to reduce those costs. Also, evaluate the organizational changes that have occurred since 9/11 and the gaps that still need to be addressed. 
Featured in this issue: Editor Note: Always Prepare for the Future, But Never Forget the Past by Catherine L. Feinman; Responding to the Call – The Cost of Caring for Others by Mary Schoenfeldt; Three Puzzle Pieces That Increase Community Preparedness by Paul Gunnels; Planning for a Cross-Country Special Event by Mark Howell and Laurel Radow; Beyond Registries: Better Solutions for People With Disabilities by June Isaacson Kailes; Citizen Soldiers and American State Defense Forces by James P. Howard; Bioterrorism â Could Smallpox Return? by Robert C. Hutchinson; Reducing Workplace Violence in Healthcare Facilities by Corina SolĂ© Brito; Cybersecurity in Hospitals and the Public Health Sector by Dan Scherr & Tanya Scherr; 