Source: Compilation of Who is Danny/Adobe Stock and ymgerman/Adobe Stock.

Dual-World Tabletop Exercises – Addressing Unmet Infrastructure Needs

Much can change over ten years. Revisiting content published by Domestic Preparedness in 2014 is a good place to start evaluating the progress made – or not made – in protecting the U.S. critical infrastructure from cyber and electromagnetic threats. With this information as a backdrop, more progress can be made through “dual-world” tabletop exercises (TTXs). This is a proposed approach to a TTX, where the same scenario is addressed by a group using the resources they actually have alongside another group, a near clone of the first, that has additional resources the first group does not have. For example, one group uses existing resources while the other receives a handful of critical community resources that enable local energy systems to operate in island mode. In this way, the outcomes of the two groups can be compared, and the benefits of the additional preparedness resources can be better understood.

High-impact threat scenarios were covered by Domestic Preparedness on September 10, 2014, with the publication of “Solar Storm Near Miss Threats to Lifeline Infrastructure.” That article highlighted critical infrastructure threats ranging from EMPs to cyberattacks. These topics were further expanded with contributions from other authors in two special issues entitled “Sustainability” on September 24, 2014, and “Blackout” on November 25, 2014. The November issue featured the article “Electromagnetic Pulse Triage & Recovery,” which discussed cost-effective EMP protection, including a four-tiered civilian infrastructure rating system modeled after the Uptime Institute’s resiliency model for data centers. In the same issue, the article “Em-Powering Communities to Prepare” delved into the vulnerabilities of cell phones, the Global Positioning System, and other electronic “lifelines” reliant on power grids.

One advantage of using more extensive impacts, such as a widespread and long-term blackout for the scenarios, is that the outcomes can help procure key infrastructure improvements that assist in other high-impact threat scenarios. The benefit of being well prepared in advance provides what Dr. Judith Rodin called in her 2014 book The Resilience Dividend. By preparing for one significant problem or disaster, communities not only are better prepared for it but also for others they could not foresee. Three such high-impact scenarios – cyber-intrusion, catastrophic solar storm, and high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack – were the subject of a 2015 TTX resource book, Triple Threat Power Grid Exercise, which was produced by the EMP Special Interest Group TTX Planning Team and edited by Catherine Feinman, Mary Lasky, and Charles Manto. A resource that adds coordinated physical attacks and pandemics to the list is the 2017 Resilient Hospitals Handbook by Charles Manto, Earl Motzer, Ph.D., and James Terbush, M.D. These resources have been used in preparation for the dual-track TTX described in this article.

Current and Emerging Threats

Since those articles and other resources were published, the threats to the nation’s infrastructure have grown. The Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s November 2020 report, “Research Roadmap on Grid-Forming Inverters,” indicated that large solar and wind farms are introducing intermittent power sources into the regional grids that are designed for steady and synchronous power sources. These asynchronous sources inadvertently create electromagnetic transients capable of causing extensive and long-term power outages, akin to accidental electromagnetic attacks on infrastructure (see the report’s sections 3.4-3). It is as if the grid is beginning to create accidental electromagnetic attacks on itself and its customers’ infrastructure. After a subsequent request for a proposal based on this report, the Department of Energy tasked the National Renewable Energy Laboratory to investigate this issue over five years due to uncertainty about preventing these accidental electromagnetic attacks.

In addition to electromagnetic threats from extreme space weather and human-caused intentional electromagnetic interference – ranging from small microwave weapons to high-altitude EMPs from nuclear weapons – communities now face accidental threats posed by the power grids. Despite some progress, efforts over the past decade to mitigate these threats have largely fallen short, leaving lifeline infrastructures inadequately protected.

Positive Developments

On the positive side, a few regional power grid companies have established electromagnetic-protected control centers, and some use neutral ground blockers to protect vulnerable transformers. In addition, some utility companies are developing emergency communication systems that are less vulnerable to EMPs. When traditional networks fail, these systems will be crucial for communication and coordination.

Joint Base San Antonio, along with its utilities, hospital, and emergency management community, have initiated an electromagnetic defense initiative that includes electromagnetic hardening of the base’s power lines to the local utility’s power generation station and the development of more resilient broadband communications. This base and its community actively participate in conferences with organizations such as InfraGard’s National Disaster Resilience Council and the Electric Infrastructure Security Council, fostering increased nationwide awareness of these issues.

Department of Defense energy programs, like the SPIDERS program (Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability and Security), have piloted projects demonstrating how local microgrids can disconnect from the main grid and operate independently. However, many projects lack funding for storage systems, and none are known to have implemented the electromagnetic protection standards long proposed by the Department of Defense.

Similarly, the Department of Energy has funded over $100 million in energy projects to help military bases establish local energy systems for island-mode operation. However, the mandates for such capabilities remain largely unfunded and unrealized. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s 2016 declaration regarding electromagnetic attack vulnerabilities remains relevant today:

An electromagnetic … attack (nuclear … [EMP] or non-nuclear EMP [e.g., high-power microwave, …) has the potential to degrade or shut down portions of the electric power grid important to the [Department of Defense]… Restoring the commercial grid from the still-functioning regions may not be possible or could take weeks or months.

In its Small Business Innovation Research program, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency accepted a proposed solution from Instant Access Networks LLC that involves electromagnetic-protected microgrids capable of operating in island mode. This approach can be nearly self-funded through savings and revenues, making it accessible to most communities. Similar to power purchasing agreements and energy or resilience-as-a-service agreements, this model can help communities better prepare for potential threats. Versions of such agreements can be provided either by utilities or third-party entities supporting local institutions and communities.

The Traditional TTX

To further address these vulnerabilities, this article proposes enhancing TTXs nationwide. These exercises, designed to highlight needs and gather resources to resolve vulnerabilities quickly, can be improved with a new dual-track (or “dual-world”) approach, not known to have been done before. Traditionally, a TTX involves emergency management and response organizations coming together to simulate and practice response capabilities. Typically held at an emergency management or fusion center, representatives of key community leadership and infrastructure gather to discuss their approach to a given disaster scenario.

During these exercises, participants are informed of the disaster’s nature, scope, and timeframe. For example, a half-day or full-day exercise might simulate a prolonged power outage starting on the fourth day of a disaster and continuing for several months. Participants may break into smaller groups to discuss their responses, returning to share their findings. Unexpected challenges introduced during the exercise – known as injects – encourage participants to adapt their strategies. After examining these injects, the group engages in a “hot wash” to share key learnings. Then, the exercise planners compile an after-action report summarizing lessons learned and recommendations for improving preparedness.

The Dual-Track TTX Approach

In an admittedly novel dual-track TTX, two groups work simultaneously on the same scenario and injects. Group A operates with the resources they have in the traditional approach described above, while Group B has additional resources. For example, on September 10, 2024, one such dual-track exercise plans to offer Group B access to five electromagnetic- and cyber-protected local energy systems (micro- or nano grids) capable of providing half their energy needs from local resources. These resources enable continued operation in island mode when centralized systems fail, as recommended by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in 2016.

With this approach, both groups convene to discuss the scenario, disaster, and injects, then separate to strategize independently. Each person or entity in Group A is mirrored in Group B, with both groups comprising emergency response organizations, hospitals, utilities, military bases, local governments, schools, or other community entities.

Following the injects, both groups conduct hot washes to report on potential loss mitigation strategies and document losses in finance, infrastructure, and lives. If the disaster is widespread and prolonged, differences in outcomes are likely to be apparent. The resulting after-action report highlights the benefits of improved resilience before the disaster, which can help communities secure the financial and in-kind support necessary to protect lives, infrastructure, and economic stability.

Invitation to Participate

The successful implementation of dual scenario TTXs can help motivate, showcase, and persuade others to assist communities in securing needed resources.  Because of the newness of this approach and the potential to significantly support communities in obtaining resources they have been unable to acquire before, prospective participants are encouraged to help make this replicable elsewhere. For these reasons, interested readers are welcome to participate in the virtual track of the in-person TTX from 9 a.m. until noon on September 10, 2024, at the Office of Emergency Management at Westover Air Reserve Base, and the community of Chicopee, Massachusetts, will undertake this dual-track approach.

The exercise will be led by Charles Manto, the proposer of this innovative approach to TTXs, along with Maj Gen (ret.) K. Luke Reiner, Dr. Earl Motzer, and local emergency management officials. Domestic Preparedness readers who are interested in participating virtually via Microsoft Teams should contact the exercise leaders directly at joseph.bernard.1@us.af.mil or robert.perreault@us.af.mil, (413) 557-3808.

Charles (Chuck) L. Manto

Charles (Chuck) L. Manto is the chief executive officer of Instant Access Networks LLC (IAN), a consulting and research and development firm that produces independently tested solutions for EMP-protected microgrids and equipment shelters for telecommunications networks and data centers. His company holds the data rights package for its SBIR program for EMP-protected microgrid systems. He received seven patents in telecommunications, computer mass storage, EMP protection and a smart microgrid controller, the core of IAN’s “Resilient Adaptive Modular-Microgrid System” (RAMSTM). He is a senior member of the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) and is chairman-emeritus of InfraGard National’s National Disaster Resilience Council. Additional publications, patents, and interviews can be found on his profile page on LinkedIn. He can be reached at cmanto@stop-EMP.com.

SHARE:

COMMENTS

Translate »