Imagining the U.S. Without Power: A Dual-World EMP Exercise

Imagine the U.S. without electricity for six months. On September 10, 2024, the leaders at Westover Air Reserve Base and the City of Chicopee in Massachusetts confronted this chilling possibility during a tabletop exercise (TTX). This event, designed to simulate the catastrophic impact of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event, tested two parallel worlds: Group A, representing a community with resources and capabilities commensurate with that of the participants in real-time, and Group B, representing a community with limited but more strategic preparedness measures in place.

By examining the outcomes of both scenarios side by side, the exercise demonstrated how even modest planning could spell the difference between societal collapse and survival. This stark comparison motivated participants to act to develop capabilities for their communities’ resilience, namely their capability of maintaining life for themselves and providing essential support for their neighbors.

Setting the Stage

The dual-world tabletop exercise was held at the emergency operations center in Chicopee, Massachusetts, in collaboration with the Chicopee Local Emergency Planning Committee and Westover Air Reserve Base (WARB). Conducted as a potential national pilot program, the event gathered participants from municipal, state, and federal agencies, including Federal Emergency Management Agency Region 1 and its state and U.S. Department of Defense counterparts, as well as private-sector and military stakeholders. The objective was to assess response capabilities in a post-EMP environment and explore opportunities for collaboration and resilience-building.

Participants were divided into two groups:

• Group A operated with only the resources available in the community at the time of the exercise. This scenario reflected the stark reality of limited preparedness.
• Group B operated with pre-identified enhancements, such as microgrids capable of providing 20–30% of required power, pre-staged food supplies like rice and beans to feed about one-third of the population, and EMP-protected communications and equipment.

The exercise focused on critical infrastructure sectors identified by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, including energy, communications, emergency services, food and agriculture, and water and wastewater systems. The outcomes vividly illustrated the consequences of differing levels of preparedness.

Group A: The World Without Preparation

In the first scenario, participants grappled with the harsh realities of a community unprepared for an EMP event. With no additional resources or hardened infrastructure, the results were grim.

• Communication system degradation: Most communication occurred through word of mouth and public meetings. Amateur radios provided limited connectivity.
• Inaccessible emergency services: Emergency services were virtually nonexistent due to a lack of transportation assets, communication, and workforce.
• Energy loss: The electrical grid remained down throughout the six-month scenario, and surviving emergency generators quickly ran out of fuel.
• Lack of food and agriculture: Starvation became widespread within weeks as food supplies dwindled.
• Gutted healthcare and public health: A lack of medicine, clean water, and sanitary conditions led to a public health crisis.
• Compromised water and wastewater systems: While gravity-fed water systems continued to function, the lack of power rendered the water non-potable, leading to widespread waterborne illnesses.

After six months, society collapsed. With an estimated loss of life at 50–75%, the community was marked by chaos, lawlessness, and death. Key infrastructure remained mostly nonfunctional, and the workforce was largely absent, focused instead on personal survival.

Group B: The Power of Preparation

In stark contrast, Group B operated with a modest level of preparedness, which significantly improved outcomes:

• Functional communication systems: Pre-staged radios and EMP-protected equipment enabled limited but functional communication within 24 hours.
• Resilient emergency services: Limited emergency services resumed quickly, employing triage methods to prioritize needs and make it possible to handle a surge of refugees from the greater Boston area.
• Accessible energy: Microgrids and nano grids provided 20–30% of the community’s power needs, enough to support limited critical infrastructure.
• Available food and agriculture: Pre-staged dry goods like rice and beans prevented starvation and incentivized first responders and other essential workers to remain on duty, knowing their families could be fed.
• Intact healthcare and public health: Limited healthcare services were restored within 24 hours, aided by pre-staged medical supplies and microgrid power.
• Safe water and wastewater: With partial power restored, water sanitation resumed, preventing a public health crisis.

After six months, people in Group B survived at a rate exceeding 50%, with some estimates reaching 75%. Society remained intact; utilities operated in a degraded but functional state; and emergency services improved steadily. The community’s ability to function, even at a reduced capacity, became a lifeline for the surrounding region. Since it was anticipated that the governor and legislature would move to the Chicopee area, continuity of government for the state was expected to continue.

Lessons Learned

This exercise underscored several critical findings.

• Incremental preparedness saves lives. Even limited measures, such as microgrids and bulk food supplies, significantly enhanced survival rates and societal stability.
• Planning for an EMP event is crucial. Protecting key assets—such as microgrids, generators, radios, and vehicles—from EMP effects can prevent cascading failures across critical infrastructure.
• Fuel storage is essential. Local bulk fuel reserves are vital for maintaining generators, vehicles, and other equipment during prolonged outages.
• Collaboration is critical. Partnerships between local governments, military bases, and regional stakeholders are essential to building resilience and ensuring coordinated responses.

Recommendations in the after-action report provided the community with actionable steps for disaster resilience. Some examples include the following:

• Local measures: Chicopee Electric Light proposed implementing EMP-hardened equipment for transformers, particularly for their bulk transformers at two substations. The city also explored the feasibility of a 30-day stockpile of non-perishable food and water, as well as the creation of a seed vault to support long-term food security.
• Microgrid development: Participants proposed that local community leaders identify the top 15 locations for EMP-protected microgrid capability, including hospitals, public safety buildings, water facilities, and food banks. To “fund resilient local energy systems and food reserves capable of feeding the population for a year” was included as a recommendation in the after-action report.  
• Regional collaboration: WARB recognized the need for coordination with other military units to assess whether consolidating resources and relocating missions could enhance overall preparedness.

The report also outlined broader goals, such as funding resilient local energy systems capable of “island-mode” operation and encouraging the adoption of Executive Order #13865 to implement EMP protections. These measures were seen as vital to safeguarding critical infrastructure against both EMP and cyberthreats.

Advocates for Strategic Investments

The TTX highlighted the importance of foresight and preparation. In this exercise, the subject matter experts advocated for strategic investments to mitigate the impact of catastrophic events. While Group A demonstrated the dire consequences of inaction, Group B proved that even partial readiness could provide a foundation for recovery and disaster resilience. Group B’s additional preparation was written into the scenario by Chuck Manto, who designed the dual-world approach. That preparation was based on his experience examining island-mode needs at hospitals as a result of a DHS-funded study he led described in the Resilient Hospitals Handbook.

This dual-world comparison ignited a sense of urgency among participants, who became motivated to take action after seeing the transformative potential of preparedness.

Leaders such as the Chicopee mayor and Westover’s wing commander expressed strong support for the TTX initiative, praising its innovative approach to resilience-building. Letters from stakeholders in attendance echoed these sentiments, acknowledging the need to implement next steps and allocate resources, transforming the exercise into something with real-world benefits.

The participants collectively agreed that seeing the side-by-side comparison of the two scenarios made it crystal clear: community leaders cannot afford to wait. Group B was not perfect, but it showed the participants what is possible with modest, well-planned investments. It gave them a vision they could act on.

The Path Forward

As a direct result of the TTX, WARB and the City of Chicopee are seeking recognition as a national pilot program because of the historic TTX just completed and through additional TTXs and site assessments for EMP-protected microgrids they hope to perform. These steps are the focus for funding the next critical steps toward implementing the lessons learned. They hope that their actions will become a model for other communities across the nation, demonstrating how strategic investments in resilience can preserve society and foster recovery after catastrophic events.

Inspired by the successes of Joint Base San Antonio’s (JBSA) “Electromagnetic Defense Initiative” as shown on their website and in interactions with JBSA leadership, Chicopee and Westover envision a future where microgrids, pre-staged supplies, and EMP protection transform vulnerable communities into resilient ones. They hope to lead the way for mid-sized communities, showing that with vision and commitment, readiness is achievable—and lifesaving.

Furthermore, an ongoing pilot program would allow Chicopee and Westover to develop detailed frameworks for other municipalities, outlining the step-by-step processes to integrate microgrids, bulk food storage, and EMP-protected infrastructure. TTX leaders hope this initiative will encourage broader adoption of these measures and foster a national culture of preparedness.

Participants indicated the exercise was about more than Westover or Chicopee. It was about creating a blueprint that can save lives across the country and the need to show that resilience is possible—and necessary.

The momentum generated by the exercise has already spurred Chicopee to plan follow-up initiatives, such as more comprehensive training programs and additional collaboration with private-sector partners to develop EMP-resistant technologies. WARB and the City of Chicopee subsequently formed a “joint all threats working group” to explore the next steps to implement the improvements and recommendations of that after-action report and held their first meeting on January 22, 2025. These next steps will expand the impact of the initial exercise, ensuring that the lessons learned ripple out to other communities. The question remains whether other communities will be ready.

Read the full Westover EMP After-Action Report and improvement plan for this tabletop exercise.